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FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THE RULE OF
LAW AND A NEW WORLD ORDER
PAUL B. STEPHAN III*
A common theme linked the Braun Lecture Series given on
April 16, 1992: The meaning and content of the concept of rule of
law. Judge Webster has stressed the differences between the "rule
of law" and "rule by law." The German term rechtsstaat,and the
Russian pravovoy gosudarstvo, capture the latter notion. Rule by
law means something quite different than the former concept as it
has evolved in Anglo-American jurisprudence. Professor Grazin
observed that an exclusive focus on the pronouncements found in
laws, without concern for their moral content, leads to the mindless
positivism and evil finality of Nazism. He also, I am sure, would
include the Stalinist system and its attendant evils as another example of what can come about under a relentlessly amoral regime
of legal positivism. Finally, Professor Ngongi asked us to consider
the incomplete relationship between law and justice.
All of these approaches test the meaning of "rule of law." Does
the concept express the fulfillment of certain fundamental moral
norms, or rather, it is an instrument used to achieve a desirable social end state? And what are the criteria, the moral content, by
which we judge whether a society successfully employs the rule of
law as either a means or an end?
My own contribution will not be to offer a clear answer to any
of these questions, but rather to note a paradox that lurks within
this inquiry. The paradox is this: without an underlying sense of
justice, decency and morality, human existence is meaningless, ugly
and degrading. Yet, a monolithic, rigid, uncompromising moral conception, one that admits to no challenge or compromise, has both
inspired and justified some of the grossest barbarisms inflicted on
human beings throughout history. Morality is essential, but undiluted it is fatal. How does one get out of this box?
I have no clear answers to this question, but rather a few intuitions. One of the defining features of the rule of law, at least as it
has developed in the United States, remains a dispersion of power
under commonly recognized rules.1 This formula, of course, ex* Percy Brown, Jr. Professor and Hunton and Williams Research Professor, University of Virginia School of Law.
1. I would note in passing that Judge Webster's career, and in particular
his tenure as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and then of the

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 26:739

tends rather than resolves the paradox. What are the commonly
recognized rules? In a world where power and political participation is far from equal, how can one separate the appearance of consensus from the reality of coercion and deception? How does one
enforce the rules, when power is dispersed? What prevents the
rule-enforcer from becoming a moral dictator, undermining the dispersion of power? Yet, one has a sense that however problematic
its logical foundations, such a system can exist and, given the
human condition as we find it, even offers the best hope for a decent
society at both the national and international levels.
I am not interested in labels, such as "liberal democratic" or
"pluralist," but rather in broad trends unfolding both intellectually
and politically. Whatever else comes out of the disgrace of the
Communist worldview and the collapse of the Soviet empire, 2 making the case for concentrated political and economic power has become harder. The naturalness of the impulse to abuse such power
or, to put it in the negative, the difficulty of eradicating the inclination toward aggrandizement in human beings, manifests itself with
such frequency that almost all arguments must start from the
premise that political and economic dictatorship is evil. I do not
believe that this point leads ineluctably to a celebration of life in
the United States; it does, however, pinpoint one of the fundamental problems underlying Soviet-type societies, defined by the concentration of such power.
Working from the premise of concentrated power as evil, what
can we say about the likely near future of those societies that seek
to attain something that we call the "rule of law"? What we presently find in the former Soviet-type states is an understandable
sense of anxiety and dismay, the aftertaste of the heady moments of
liberation (that is to say, of December 1989 and August 1991).
These countries have experienced the breakdown of the social and
Central Intelligence Agency, exemplifies the fulfillment of this idea of the dispersion of power under commonly accepted rules. Judge Webster understood

that these necessary instruments of government could exist in a civilized society
only if there existed shared control over their activities. In the case of the FBI,
he worked hard to make that agency more responsive to the commands of the
courts, especially with respect to the requirements of constitutional criminal

procedure. His investment in and support of the FBI Academy, for example,
helped to reinforce the idea that the Bureau, and police officials generally, had
to abide by the law as a necessary part of enforcing it. And at the FBI, and even
more at the CIA,' he strengthened the role of legislative oversight, both as a

check on reckless ambition within the Executive and as a means of having Congress take responsibility for the actions of those agencies. He came to the CIA

at a time when a deep crisis over a failure to honor the dictates of Congress had
plunged that agency into turmoil; his administration did much to restore the

balance of shared control.
2. I count myself a pessimist here. It seems most unlikely that societies
where command economies and nomenklaturapolitical systems flourished will
soon become bastions of freedom as the West understands that concept.
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intellectual structures that previously made sense of everyday life,
even as their obvious contradictions and failures subverted their
claims to legitimacy. Many people now fear that anarchy is the natural successor of totalitarianism, and believe that their countries
are slipping into a state of chaos. Are they right? In countries that
treated self-command and individual initiative as dangerous deviations from social norms, does the dispersion of power mean
anarchy?
One rejoinder is to preach the virtues of constitutional norms
that draw on the principles of checks and balances and separation of
powers. These institutions, of course, are bulwarks of a free and
democratic society. Much of the advice and technical assistance
that Western lawyers have given the citizens and governments of
the formerly socialist countries focuses on them. I endorse this
counsel, but not without reservations. Political institutions, especially at the national level, tend to be abstract. After decades of
cynical and mean public life, the people of the post-Soviet world
have trouble drawing inspiration from any politicians, no matter
how elegant or fair the new structures in which they operate may
be. Politics also play out through layers of mediation, for example,
as presented by the media, which until the onset of glasnost' inspired mostly distrust and contempt. If the concept of dispersion of
power under commonly accepted rules is to have any bite, it must
be tangible and commonplace. People must see it in operation constantly if they are to allow it to shape the new culture that will
emerge in the post-Soviet world.
To make the dispersion of power under commonly accepted
rules vivid and real, these countries must develop the institution of
private property. In theory, of course, the legal systems of the Soviet Union and its dependencies recognized a concept of property,
but the practical reality encompassed a complex dualism that excluded free and open disposition of personally held assets for the
purpose of creating wealth. The state claimed a monopoly over productive activity, and the underground or "shadow" economy that
developed to correct some of the lapses of that system operated entirely outside the law, whatever other kinds of legitimacy it might
have had. Somehow the new societies must find a way for their
citizens to identify productive ownership-the linkage of property
with investment, and investment with effort, risk-taking and return-with law, both in its formal sense and as a deep cultural
norm. By making property effective, they can make law concrete.
Why private property as a prerequisite of the rule of law?
First, the alternative to private ownership of the means of production is a state monopoly over economic activity. Such a monopoly
violates the principle of eschewing concentrations of political and

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 26:739

economic power. A functioning private sector offers edifying comparisons with the performance of the state, both as a deliverer of
services and a creator of wealth. Like any abstract principle, this
concept can be abused: a concentration of economic power in the
hands of a close-knit group of private persons is no less fraught with
the potential for evil than is a state monopoly. The point is not that
private property, as such, guarantees a dispersion of power, but
rather that without private property no dispersion can exist.
Second, private property can operate as a vital social institution
only if a broad consensus exists concerning the rules of property. If
property means anything more than naked possession, it must depend on mutual recognition of the possessor's and owner's rights. It
is not enough for the state to proclaim that these rights exist, if the
general population will subvert them in the absence of constant and
direct coercion. For separation of ownership and control to take
place, both those who control the disposition of assets and those
who have a claim to a return for their use must understand their
relationship.
Judge Webster placed particular stress on the need for an independent judiciary in a system based on the rule of law. Part of
the genius of the institution of property is that it encourages disputants to turn to disinterested arbitrators, in other words judges, to
determine their claims to ownership. If the judiciary of the former
Soviet-type countries are to gain the respect of the citizenry, that
they do not have yet, they must be seen as fairly dispensing disinterested justice. Intervention in high-profile political disputes
might help to build this perception3 but such cases may not occur
often, and, like the politics that underlie them, will seem distant
and abstract to many observers. More mundane, but ultimately
more useful in terms of nurturing a culture of legality, will be the
expeditious resolution of disputes over ownership in a manner that
earns the confidence of all parties.
Consider the history of constitutional development in the
United States. Of the landmark cases of the Marshall Court, the
constitutional moments that largely determined what kind of governmental structure we would have, three of the most important
4
had at their root a dispute about property. Marbury v. Madison
was a contest over a government position, a rent-collecting entitlement, as well as a clash over the power of judicial review. Martin v.
Hunter'sLessee 5 involved a dispute over title to land, although the
3. Arguably, the Russian Constitutional Court's resolution of the dispute
over abolishing the Communist Party bolstered the public's impression of that
court's legitimacy.
4. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
5. 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
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Supreme Court to resolve it had to establish its primacy over the
state courts. And Gibbons v. Ogden6 , which along with McCulloch
v. Maryland,7 located the authority to regulate interstate commerce
squarely in the federal government, turned on a determination of
the validity of a steamship franchise. In other words, the Marshall
Court established its authority, both over and as part of the national
government, by making that authority indispensable to the resolution of property disputes, and by resolving those disputes in a fashion that inspired confidence rather than cynicism.
Does a society that recognizes private property by that choice
alone achieve the rule of law? Is a legal system that expends a considerable portion of its energies defining and protecting the institution of private property for that reason imbued with a moral sense?
If a system supports property, is it therefore just? The answer to all
these questions is the same-obviously no. My point is rather that
property, in subtle ways that we may not fully appreciate, can both
inculcate a culture of legality in those societies that have lost their
respect for law, and deter the development of one kind of injustice,
namely the concentration of power in the hands of a few.
Where does this leave us as far as the content and limits of the
rule of law are concerned? First, it would be the height of folly to
suggest that developing a culture based on the rule of law would
solve all the problems faced by those states that are now groping
away from political and economic dictatorship. No one has suggested that it would. Second, it is reasonable to believe, although
perhaps not uncontroversial, that promotion of a system of governance and social order based on dispersion of power under commonly
accepted rules is a necessary, although not a sufficient, requirement
for building a decent civil society on the ashes of Soviet-type socialism. We cannot make the claim that such a development will end
injustice or achieve a full realization of moral norms in those societies, but we can contend that without the establishment of a lawbased culture the goals of freedom and prosperity will remain
elusive.
As lawyers, as well as in our role as morally driven individuals,
we should take heart from these conclusions. We do not have any
panaceas-none of us is Jonas Salk, developing a vaccine that will
eradicate a terrible malady-but we do possess particular skills and
habits of mind that can help to make the world a better place.
Surely we can be satisfied with that.

6. 22 U.S. (1824).
7. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).

